In this paper, we propose an elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)-based certificateless multi-receiver encryption scheme for device to device communications on Internet of Things (IoT) applications. The proposed scheme eliminates computation expensive pairing operations to provide a lightweight multi-receiver encryption scheme, which has favourable properties for IoT applications. In addition to less time usage for both sender and receiver, the proposed scheme offers the necessary security properties such as source authentication, implicit user authentication, message integrity, and replay attack prevention for secure data exchange. In this paper, we show security proof for the proposed scheme based on the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). We implemented our proposed scheme on a real embedded Android device and confirmed that it achieves less time cost for both encryption and decryption compared with the existing most efficient certificate-based multi-receiver encryption scheme and certificateless multi-receiver encryption scheme.
Introduction
Nowadays, the role of Internet of Things (IoT) grows in popularity as the number of smart devices and sensors increases. In some IoT applications related to healthcare, smart homes and group communications, sensitive data is exchanged among multiple users. For example, pedestrians who feel concerns for their health around a station send vital data, which is generated by body sensors and attached to smartphones, to nearby doctors or nurses with the purpose of improving their well-being, getting advice or healthcare. In such applications, a lightweight multireceiver encryption scheme to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity is necessary to provide not only security but also efficiency.
To securely exchange information with fast computing speed, a symmetric encryption scheme can be used. However, it introduces security requirements such as authentication of parties in key agreement protocol or secure and integrity-assured key distribution to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks and other attacks. Without the use of public-key cryptography, a symmetric key scheme is not sufficient to get secure communication features such as confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and 1 Osaka University, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan yoshihisa@cmc.osaka-u.ac.jp c) ishi.yoshimasa@ais.cmc.osaka-u.ac.jp d) kawakami@is.naist.jp e) teranisi@cmc.osaka-u.ac.jp f) shimojo@cmc.osaka-u.ac.jp non-repudiation. Although the conventional public key infrastructure (PKI) is widely used in the current ICT systems, it is not suitable for resource-constrained devices due to its certificate overhead [1] . To avoid the certificate management problem, in identity-based cryptography introduced by Shamir [2] , unique strings such as identities are used as public keys. However, an unconditionally trusted third party called key generation center (KGC) or (PKG) exists to generate system parameters and private keys for all users. As a result, a private key generator can eavesdrop all exchanged messages as it knows all users' private keys. This problem is called the key escrow problem. To simplify the certificate management of traditional public key cryptography and the key escrow problem of identity-based public key encryption, the concept of certificateless public key cryptography has been proposed by Al-Riyami and Paterson [3] . In certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKE), the key generation process is split between PKG and the users. Key Generation Center issues the partial public key and the user generates their own public key and private key pair. To decrypt the ciphertext, both partial private key and private key are required. Knowing only partial private key, KGC cannot eavesdrop exchanged messages. In this way, the key escrow problem is avoided. Moreover, certificateless public key encryption eliminates the use of a certificate as the public key of the user is generated using the parameters given by KGC.
In devices with sensitive personal data, no trust exists on others but itself. Full control is in the hands of the device owner. In sharing sensitive data among the owners of controlled devices, it is necessary to ensure the trustworthiness of users. Although third party involvement may exist to prove valid users, the key c 2018 Information Processing Society of Japan escrow problem should be avoided so that users can control data access directly. To be able to share the sensitive data among owners' controlled devices, certificateless public key encryption is an optimal solution.
Contribution: In this paper, we propose a lightweight and secure certificateless multi-receiver encryption scheme using elliptic curve cryptography. To ensure authentication, the proposed scheme provides implicit user authentication and source authentication. Moreover, the proposed scheme offers message integrity and replay attack prevention as the necessary security properties for secure data exchange. In addition to this, computation expensive pairing operations are eliminated to achieve less time usage for both sender and receiver. In this paper, we provide security proof for the proposed scheme based on the intractability of the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm problem (ECDLP). According to the computational cost comparison and experimental results, we confirm that the proposed scheme achieves a multi-receiver encryption scheme with better efficiency and more security properties. This paper is an extension of our previous work [24] . Compared to our previous paper, this paper shows more concrete security proofs and new experimental results.
Related Works
For a multi-receiver setting, several identity-based encryption schemes and certificateless encryption schemes have been proposed.
Although identity-based encryption schemes have a key escrow problem, some identity-based encryption schemes try to avoid the key escrow problem. In identity-based multi-receiver encryption schemes (Refs. [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] ), a key escrow problem exists. In Ref. [15] , a key escrow problem exists although source authentication property is provided for multi-receiver setting. In an identity-based multi-receiver scheme [16] , no key escrow problem exists as users generate their own key pair. Although key generation introduces some load on the sender, its merit is that there is no key escrow problem. In terms of computational cost, the scheme in Ref. [16] achieves better efficiency than the identity-based multi-receiver encryption scheme proposed in Ref. [4] because it reduces one pairing operation not only for encryption but also for decryption. However, in Ref. [16] , the sender uses only the public keys of receivers for encryption. As a result, the adversary can easily impersonate the authentic receiver in communication of unknown devices in a large and highly dynamic environment. There are two options for public key validation: using the central public key directory service or explicit key validation. In the former case, communication overhead exists. Computation overhead for two pairing operations will be required in the latter case. Moreover, the scheme does not consider source authentication and replay attack prevention.
Certificateless public key scheme has been proposed to avoid the key escrow problem. However, most certificateless public key schemes are based on computation expensive bilinear pairing operations (Refs. [3] , [17] ). For better performance, certificateless public key encryption schemes without pairing have been proposed in Refs. [18] and [19] . To achieve a stronger security model than that of Refs. [18] , [19] has been proposed. In Ref. [19] , a pair of ciphertext is required for a single receiver. As a result, the ciphertext length will increase as the number of receivers becomes larger. Moreover, source authentication and replay attack prevention are not considered in both schemes. To achieve certificateless multi-receiver encryption with source authentication, Refs. [17] and [21] have been presented. In Ref. [17] , expensive pairing operations are required for encryption and decryption. And the number of pairing operations is directly proportional to the number of receivers in a multi-receiver setting. Although Ref. [21] avoids a pairing operation in encryption, it requires two pairing operations for decryption and source authentication. Moreover, its ciphertext size is twice the ciphertext size of identitybased signcryption scheme [15] . To resist Type-I adversary attack in Ref. [21] , an enhanced scheme is proposed in Ref. [22] . In Ref. [22] , the security weakness in Ref. [21] is solved by eliminating randomness reuse in the computation of a parameter for all receivers. As a result, more pairing exponentiation is required for encryption. Moreover, decryption needs one more pairing operation and replay attack prevention is not considered. An existing certificateless multi-receiver encryption scheme has been presented in Ref. [23] . In Ref. [23] , computation expensive pairing operations are used in both encryption and decryption. In addition to this, the scheme does not consider source authentication and replay attack prevention.
Preliminaries
In this section, we describe the framework of the proposed scheme, elliptic curve cryptography, computational hard problem upon which the security of the proposed scheme relies, Schnorr signature scheme and security requirements for messages.
Framework of the Proposed Scheme
The difference from existing scheme is that the proposed scheme eliminates computation expensive pairing operations while providing necessary security properties. We defined a multi-receiver algorithm using public-key encryptions for confidentiality, which were achieved by pairing operations in the existing schemes. Though the proposed scheme eliminates pairing operations, its confidentiality is achieved under the hard ECDLP assumption, which is proved in Section 6.1. Proposed scheme consists of five polynomial time algorithms.
• Setup: A trusted third party runs this algorithm to generate public parameters params and its master secret key s.
• Set-Key-Pair: For key escrow problem avoidance, all users (senders and receivers) run this algorithm to generate a public key and private key.
• Partial-Private-Key-Extract: A trusted third party generates identity-based partial private keys for all users based on Schnorr signature scheme.
• Encrypt: The sender runs this algorithm to encrypt the message M by using the params, public key of a trusted third party and target receivers' public keys. To maintain message authentication and replay attack prevention properties, the sender generates a signature. Finally, ciphertext C is given as output.
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• Decrypt: The receiver runs this algorithm that takes C, params, partial private key and private key as input to get back plaintext message M.
Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is an approach to publickey cryptography based on the elliptic curves over finite fields. An elliptic curve E over F p is defined by an equation of the form y 2 = x 3 + ax + b mod p where a, b ∈ F p and F p is a finite field containing p elements. Let P be the point on E. Then, the scalar multiplication sP means adding P for s-times. Elliptic curves are widely used in cryptography due to its smaller key size and faster scalar multiplication.
The security of elliptic curve cryptography is proven by the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP).
Computational Hard Problem
Let P and Q = xP be two points on elliptic curve E. Given P and Q, the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) is to find x. The size of the elliptic curve determines the difficulty of the problem.
Assumption: ECDLP is assumed to be intractable for large elliptic curve parameters.
Schnorr Signature Scheme
Let G be a group of prime order q, P be generator, and H : {0, 1} * ∈ Z q be one-way hash function. The Schnorr signature scheme uses a group G in which the discrete logarithm problem is hard. It consists of the following algorithms.
• Key generation: Generate public key pk = (P, Q = sP) by choosing private key s ∈ Z q .
• Signing: For signing message M ∈ {0, 1} * , choose r ← Z q randomly. Then, compute R = rP, e = H(M||R) and t = r + se mod q. The signature is (R, t).
• Verifying: Compute e(M||R). If tP = R + eQ, the signature is verified. The security of the Schnorr signature scheme is based on the intractable one-way hash function and discrete logarithm problem.
Security Requirements for Message
The basic security requirements for message are message confidentiality, message authentication and replay attack prevention.
• Message Confidentiality: Confidentiality is the process that protects sensitive information or message from unauthorized receivers. Only authorized receivers can reveal the information.
• Message Authentication: Source authentication is the process that the receivers can verify the source of the message. Message integrity is the assurance that the message has not been altered in transit. Message authentication is a property that can prove both source authentication and message integrity.
• Replay Attack Prevention: A replay attack is a form of network attack in which a valid data transmission is repeated or delayed maliciously or fraudulently. It can be prevented by adding the session key or timestamp to the broadcasted message.
Security Model
In this section, we describe types of adversaries, the oracles that they can access, and the restricted behaviour for them. Then, we define the security notion for the proposed scheme: "Indistinguishability of encryptions under the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack" (IND-CCA).
Adversaries
We consider two types of adversaries, Type-I and Type-II adversary.
• Type-I adversary is an adversary who does not possess the master secret key. The adversary is allowed to replace the public key.
• Type-II adversary is an honest but curious KGC who knows the master secret key. Type-II adversary is not allowed to replace any public key.
Oracles for Type-I Adversary
For the security of the proposed scheme, a game is played between adversary A and a challenger C. In the game, Type-I adversary can access the following six oracles.
• CreateUser: The oracle accepts identity as input and returns the corresponding public key. If the public key for the identity does not exist in the user list, it runs Set-KeyPair and Partial-Private-key-Extract algorithms to generate public key, private key and partial private key. And then, it returns the public key.
• Request-Public-Key : The oracle accepts an identity as input. It returns the corresponding public key.
• Replace-Public-Key: This oracle allows the adversary to replace the public key of identity with any valid values of its own choice.
• Extract-Private-Key: This oracle accepts an identity as input and outputs the corresponding private key. The restriction of the oracle is that the adversary cannot request ExtractPrivate-Key if he or she has already replaced the public key for identity.
• Extract-Partial-Private-Key: This oracle takes an identity as input and returns the corresponding partial private key. The restriction of the oracle is that the adversary cannot request Extract-Partial-Private-Key if he or she has already replaced the public key for identity.
• Decrypt: The oracle accepts an identity and a ciphertext as input. Using private key and partial private key corresponding to the given identity, the oracle decrypts the ciphertext and outputs the corresponding plaintext. Type-I adversary can access all of the above oracles. The following restrictions exist for Type-I adversary.
• Adversary cannot access Extract-Partial-Private-Key oracle for the target identities and target sender at any point.
• Adversary cannot access Extract-Private-Key oracle for the target identities and target sender at any point.
Oracles for Type-II Adversary
Type-II adversary can access the following oracles.
• Request-Public-Key : The oracle accepts identity as input. It returns the corresponding public key.
• Decrypt: The oracle accepts an identity and a ciphertext as input. Using private key and partial private key corresponding to the given identity, the oracle decrypts the ciphertext and outputs the corresponding plaintext. Type-II adversary can access all of the above oracles. The following restrictions exist for Type-II adversary.
Chosen CipherText Attack (CCA)
The proposed scheme is (IND-CCA) secure if no polynomialtime adversary A (Type-I or Type-II) has a non-negligible advantage in the following game played against the challenger C under hard ECDLP assumption.
• Setup: The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm to generate public parameters params and master secret key s. It gives public parameters params to adversary A. Master secret key is kept secret it if adversary A is Type-I adversary.
In case of Type-II adversary A, master secret key is given to A.
. . , ID * n }, target sender ID u and sends them to A.
• Phase 2: A can access the following queries for q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q de where q de is one of -Hash queries: The challenger C returns the results of hashed operations for inputs given by A. -Oracles: The adversary A can issue requests to corresponding oracles with the restricted adversary behaviour.
• Challenge: Adversary A chooses two plaintext messages (M 0 , M 1 ) and sends them to challenger C, with restriction that M 0 , M 1 are two distinct messages of the same length. A is allowed for all the queries in Phase 2. C then randomly selects α ∈ {0, 1} and ciphertext C * is generated using ID * i , ID u and M α .
• Phase 3: A can make the same queries in Phase 2, except Decrypt oracle with C * = C and ID i ∈ ID * i .
• Guess: Finally, A outputs α ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game if α = α. The adversary A is defined as IND-CCA adversary. The advantage of A to win the game is
A breaks IND-CCA with (ti, q de , ) if adversary A's advantage is non-negligible after q de queries within running time ti. If no adversary breaks the scheme with (ti, q de , ), then the scheme is (ti, q de , )-IND-CCA secure.
Proposed Scheme
In this section, we will present the proposed scheme with security notations in detail. The security notations and their descriptions are shown in Table 1 .
Proposed scheme consists of the following algorithms.
• Setup: Trusted third party runs this algorithm to generate public parameters params and master secret key (s ∈ Z q ). Master secret key is kept secret.
• Set-Key-Pair: Each user (i) runs this algorithm to generate key pair. Firstly, user selects sk i ∈ Z q randomly. To obtain partial private key, (ID i , P i = sk i P, P i1 = sk i Pub s ) is sent to trusted third party. After getting partial private key from trusted third party, user performs the following steps.
• Partial-Private-Key-Extract: Trusted third party generates partial private key by performing the following steps.
( 1 ) Third party checks the validity of user's public key by checking whether P i1 is equal to sP i or not. If not, third party rejects for partial private key generation. ( 2 ) Additional verification process is done using user identity and other additional verification proofs. ( 3 ) After the user has been successfully verified, third party performs the following steps.
-Selects x i ∈ Z q uniformly at random.
is given to user via secure channel.
• Encrypt: To encrypt message M for n-receivers ( j = 1, 2, . . . , n), the sender chooses r ∈ Z q and σ ∈ {0, 1} k randomly. Then, it computes
to receivers where L is a label describing association of each receiver and U j .
• Decrypt: Each receiver performs the following steps to decrypt the ciphertext C. If they are not equal, reject the ciphertext. Otherwise, return M as the plaintext. The correctness of the proposed scheme can be checked as follows:
Message authentication and replay attack prevention can be checked as follows:
Each user (i) can check the validity of third party generated partial private key by checking whether d i P = h i Pub s + X i . Partial private key is generated based on the Schnorr signature scheme proposed in Ref. [25] . Therefore, the partial private key generation scheme using G 1 with hard DL assumption is provably secure in the random oracle.
Security Analysis
In this section, we show the proposed scheme is IND-CCA secure with confidentiality and provides authenticity, message integrity and replay attack prevention.
Security Game for Confidentiality
For the confidentiality of the proposed scheme, the security game is based on "Indistinguishability of encryptions under adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks" (IND-CCA). The proposed scheme is (IND-CCA) secure in the random oracle model if no polynomial time adversary A (Type-I or Type-II) has a nonnegligible advantage in the following games played against the challenger C under hard ECDLP assumption.
Theorem 1: When a polynomial time adversary A (Type-I adversary) can attack the scheme with advantage with the help of H i (1 ≤ i ≤ 4) random oracles, then there is an algorithm B that can solve ECDLP with non-negligible advantage. Let h1-list, h2-list, h3-list and h4-list be the result of querying H i (1 ≤ i ≤ 4) random oracles respectively.
Proof: Suppose that B has (P, bP) as an instance of the ECDLP.
• Setup: B runs the setup algorithm to generate public parameters params where Pub s = bP and master secret key s ← ⊥. B gives params to adversary A. 
B returns the public key pk i to A. Otherwise, B makes CreateUser query. • Challenge: A submits two plaintext messages (M 0 , M 1 ) with the same length. B does the encryption by randomly selecting α ∈ {0, 1}, r ∈ Z q and σ ∈ {0, 1} k . It then computes < C = a, U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U n , V, W, Y, L, t > by performing the following steps and using the hash oracles
Type-I adversary's random oracles H i (1 ≤ i ≤ 4) work as follows: 
, sk i ∈ Z q randomly and computes X i = x i P, P i = sk i P, P i = P i + X i and • Challenge: A submits two plaintext messages (M 0 , M 1 ) with the same length. B does the encryption by randomly selecting α ∈ {0, 1}, r ∈ Z q and σ ∈ {0, 1} k . It then computes < C = a, U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U n , V, W, Y, L, t > by performing the following steps and using the hash oracles
Type-II adversary's random oracles H i (1 ≤ i ≤ 4) work as follows: 
Source Authentication
Theorem 3: Under hard discrete logarithm assumption, the signature (a) is existentially unforgeable in the random oracle model.
Proof: Let A be any probabilistic time adversary with running time t A , making q s queries to signature oracle, and q H3 random oracle queries to H 3 oracle. B acts as a challenger and responds to A's signature and H 3 queries. Public key of third party, public key of target sender (pk u ) and X u are given to challenger B as the signature public keys.
• Challenger B sends the signature public keys to A. B then chooses w ∈ [1, q H3 ] randomly. Assume that the adversary A will forge the signature on the wth H 3 query. • signature oracle: For i-th signature query using message
• For jth H 3 query on (M j ||σ j ||L j ||t j ||Y j ), B does the following ( 1 ) If the value of H 3 query already exists, return the value. • On receiving a forgery attempt (
A, send a * to valid receiver of target sender. If the jth hash query is (M * ||σ * ||L * ||t * ||Y * ) and a
. Then, the signature forgery is valid and the source authentication property of the proposed scheme is broken. The probability that the jth hash query gets valid input will be 1/(q H3 ). And the probability that signature oracle issues duplicate Y value is (q H3 +q S +1)/q. Suppose the probability that adversary A can produce a valid signature forgery is . Then, there is an algorithm B that can impersonate the valid sender with probability at least /(q H3 ) − (q H3 + q S + 1)/q.
To forge the valid signature a, the third party needs to reveal the value of sk u from P u . Suppose trusted third party calculates h
Then, the result msk u + r is same to the Schnorr signature scheme. Therefore, the security of the source authentication lies on the ECDLP problem that is computationally intractable in polynomial time. As a result, the signature a is existentially unforgeable in the random oracle model.
Implicit User Authentication
Theorem 4: According to the security model for adversaries and the discrete logarithm assumption holds in the elliptic group, then it also provides implicit user authentication in the random oracle model with the restricted adversary behaviour.
Proof: For implicit user authentication, the sender uses the public key of receivers and public key of a trusted third party. Therefore, only receivers who have a corresponding private key and master secret key of third party can decrypt the ciphertext. Receivers knows the master secret key of the third party indirectly from the valid partial private key. Among the oracles for a different adversary, the following two oracles also exist.
• 
, sk i ∈ Z q randomly and computes X i = x i P, P i = sk i P, P i = P i + X i and P i = h
B returns the public key pk i to A. Otherwise, B makes CreateUser query. However, if signature unforgeability exists under hard discrete logarithm assumption, the proposed scheme is secure against the ciphertext forgery in the random oracle.
Replay Attack Prevention
Theorem 6: If the proposed scheme is secure against signature forgery if no polynomially bounded adversary has non-negligible advantage, then the proposed scheme is secure against replay attack in the random oracle model.
Proof: In our proposed scheme, timestamp (t) is added in calculation of m value. Again, (m) is used to create signature (a). Although timestamp value is public, replay attack is prevented as the signature a is existentially unforgeable in the random oracle model. So, the proposed scheme is secure against replay attack in the random oracle model since it is secure against signature forgery in the random oracle model if no polynomially bounded adversary has a non-negligible advantage.
To use timestamps for preventing replay attacks, the synchronization of time at the sender and receiver is required. The validity of timestamp should be restricted to a short time period in order to tolerate data delivery latency or time inaccuracy. Time synchronization can be done by using several time synchronization methods such as Network Time Protocol (NTP).
Performance Analysis
In this section, experimental performance evaluations of the proposed scheme were done to show the computational cost comparisons with the existing schemes and the feasibility of the actual IoT scenarios.
Assumed IoT Scenario
In the many IoT systems, to process data that is generated by lower-performance embedded devices, they assume computationally powerful and network-connected computers such as smartphones, home computers, and so on that work as gateways for such devices. The gateway has the computation ability to process data instead of processing data on the lower-performance devices. This system architecture is the so-called "edge computing environment" [26] , [27] . In the performance evaluation, we also assume such architecture to treat secure multi-receiver data delivery with encryptions for lower-performance devices. The gateway encrypts and decrypts data using our proposed scheme for multi-receiver data delivery on behalf of the lower-performance devices. The lower-performance devices only need to connect to a gateway using standard lightweight secure protocols such as Bluetooth and WiFi. In the evaluation, we measured the encryption and decryption performances on the gateways. We used a c 2018 Information Processing Society of Japan smart phone with android version 4.4.2 with Quad-core 1.2 GHz Cortex-A9 CPU and 1 GB RAM as an average performance gateway. We assumed a desirable encryption or decryption time on the gateway device as less than 10 seconds, which is a tolerable response time for many applications [28] , [29] . The performance of network transfer latency and overheads on lower-performance devices are beyond the scope of this evaluation.
Experimental Setup
For existing schemes [16] , [22] , [23] , we use a super singular elliptic curve over F p having subgroup of order q by defining values of p = 512 bits, q = 160 bits, and length of k0 = k = 192 bits. For pairing operation, symmetric bilinear pairing e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 is used where G 1 is an additive cyclic group of prime order q and G 2 is a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order q. Implementation is done using android library 5.1.1 and jpbc 1.2.1 library [30] . To implement the same security level, in the proposed scheme, we use a non-singular elliptic curve over F p having group of order q where p = 160 bits and q = 160 bits, and bouncy castle library [31] . To compare computation cost, operation costs for elements in G 1 and G 2 are considered. Notations and descriptions for operations are described in Table 2 . Although the proposed scheme requires one more scalar multiplication for public key P i , it can be neglected as it is calculated just for once.
Security Properties
Although all schemes avoid the key escrow problem, only the proposed scheme provides replay attack prevention. Among all schemes, the scheme described in Ref. [22] and the proposed scheme achieve source authentication. In existing scheme [16] , implicit user authentication property fails as the sender uses the public keys of receivers in encryption. Without checking the validity and authenticity of public keys, adversaries can easily impersonate authentic receivers. To authenticate the receivers, the scheme will require two pairing operations. From the perspective of security properties, the schemes are compared in Table 3 . 
Encryption Cost
In existing scheme [16] , the encryption cost of sender for nreceivers is n(2T mul + T add ) + T expo . For n-receivers, encryption time cost of sender by eliminating pre-computed pairing operation is n(T mul + T expo + T pow ) + 2T mul and n(2T mul + T add ) + 3T mul for Refs. [22] and [23] respectively. In Ref. [22] , the encryption cost will be n(2T mul + T expo + T pow + T add ) + 2T mul if the sender is not PKG that knows the master secret key. In the proposed scheme, n(T mul + T add ) + 2T mul is required for n-receivers encryption. Computational cost for encryption is compared in Table 4 .
Experimental comparison of encryption time is shown in Fig. 1 . Among existing schemes, Ref. [16] requires less encryption time cost than that of Refs. [22] and [23] . That is because the computational cost is less than that of Refs. [22] and [23] . Although additional security properties are provided, the proposed scheme achieves faster encryption time for multi-receivers than all of the existing schemes because of less computational cost for encryption.
As the evaluation result shows, the encryption time is proportional to the number of receivers. Therefore, if the number of receivers becomes larger, the proposed scheme may not satisfy the system requirements. According to the evaluation result in Fig. 1 , it takes longer than 10 seconds to encrypt data when there are 30 receivers in the proposed scheme. In the existing schemes, it took 15-22 seconds when there are 30 receivers. To achieve lower encryption time for a large number of receivers, we can apply the proposed scheme for initial key delivery for later communication via NIST-approved lightweight cryptographic primitives [32] .
Decryption Cost
We consider the decryption time cost for a receiver. The scheme in Ref. [16] requires T pair + T expo for calculating σ and 2T mul + T add for checking message integrity and U i con- Table 4 Encryption cost comparison.
Encryption Cost for (n-receiver) Ref. [16] Ref. [22] Ref. [23] Proposed Scheme sistency. The scheme [22] requires T pair + T expo for decryption and 2T pair + 2T mul + 2T add for checking message authentication. In Ref. [23] , decryption cost is 4T pair + T pdiv . In the proposed scheme, decryption time cost is T mul for calculating σ , T mul for U i consistency, and 2T mul + 4T add for checking message authentication and replay attack. Computational cost for decryption is compared in Table 5 . Experimental comparison of decryption time is shown in Fig. 2 . Among all schemes, the decryption cost of Ref. [22] is the highest as it uses more computation expensive pairing operations. The decryption cost of Ref. [16] is less than that of Refs. [22] and [23] as it uses less pairing operation. Among all schemes, the proposed scheme achieves the fastest decryption cost because it avoids the computation of expensive pairing operations in decryption.
Concluding Remarks
We have proposed an efficient and secure multi-receiver encryption scheme with lightweight nature for the device to device communications on Internet of Things (IoT) applications. Our proposed scheme avoids the inherent key escrow problem as existing certificate-based and certificateless multi-receiver encryption schemes do. Moreover, our proposed scheme achieves multireceiver encryption with better efficiency and more security properties. Under Discrete Logarithm assumption, security proofs in the random oracles are also given for the proposed scheme. From the computational cost comparison and experimental results, the proposed scheme achieves faster encryption and decryption time compared to the existing schemes in a multi-receiver environment.
